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Interviewed 8/14/2019, Denied 8/16/20l9

To Whom It May Concern,
is currently serving a sentence of 25 to Life for second degree murder; he has
appeared before theiiard
of Parole on 5 occasions and has accordingly been behind bars for more
than 3.1 years. •
COMP AS scores, achievements while incarcerated, and family and
community support in 1cate that he presents the lowest possible risk of violence or recidivi~m . His
record of rehabilitation, demonstrated remorse and carefully organized plan for release are such that
the Kings County District Attorney submitted an extraordinary letter to the Parole Board on August
12, 2019, affirmatively supporting
release to supervision and arguing that to further
incarcerate him\. ould serve no discernible purpose. And yet, at Mr. last appearance, he was
denied parole, for another 18 months.
The Board's most recent decision to deny his freedom had three bases: the
circumstances of the instant offense, his .criminal history, and his record of prison misconduct. All
three constitute unexplained and unjustifiable departures from · -COMPAS scores. The
Board's decision was also predicated upon a total disregard for the DA's recommendation and a
misunderstanding as to 'the sentencing court s recommendation. The Board' s most recent decision
should thus be reversed, and a de novo hearing conducted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Decisions of the Board of Parole are discretionary and will upheld so long as the Board
complied with the statutory requirements. Executive Law§ 259-i. Upon Article 78 petition, .a Court
will only annul a denial of parole when it is "arbitrary and capricious' and "irrational bordering on
impropriety." Russo v. N.Y State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980). Case Jaw d.ictates that the Parole
Board's written decision is improp·er if it fails to explain the reasons for denial of parole "in detail and
not in conclus0ry terms." N.Y. Exec. Law. 259-i(2)(a); Rossakis v. N.Y State Bd. of Parole, !46
A.D.3d 22 (I st Dep't 2016); Ramirez v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 707 (2d Dep' t 2014). Though it need not
discuss each factor in detail, a written decision• may not summarily itemize a petitioner' s achievement$
while in.carcerated or render a conclusory decision parroting the statutory standard." Coaxum v. N. r.
Stule Bd. of Parole, 14 Misc.3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006).
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 5, 1990, Mr. was sentenced to 25 to Life, after being acquitted by a
jury of intentional murder and convicted of felon. murder, for the gas station robbery-turned-killing
of one
a taxi driver. was, at the time, a cocaine addict; the attempted
robbery was motivated by his need for money to fuel his addiction and was made possible by his prior
purchase of a shotgun.
first appeared before Commissioners Ludlow and Coppola of the Board of Parole
on August 6, 2013. He was denied, because of concern for the public safety and welfare, and because
his release would "tend to deprecate the seriousness of the instant offense and undennine respect for
the law."
second appearance took place before Commissioners Ferguson, Ludlow, and
Elovich two years later on August 5, 2015. He was again denied because of concern for the public
safety and welfare, because his release would "tend to deprecate the seriousness of the instant offense
and undermine respect for the law', because of the 'extreme violence" exhibited in the instant offense
- a "severe escalation of a Jong paltern of illegal conduct ' - and because of a Tier III infraction he
had incurred 16 montbs prior to the bearing. This decision was reversed for failure to conduct a Case
~m.
.
de novo hearing took place before Commissioners Smith and HaUerdin on April
26, 2016. He was again denied, because the Board found there was a "reasonable probability that [he]
would not live at liberty without again violating the law, because of the senseless crime thnt was an
escalation in his criminal history, his failure to benefit from prior sanctions, and concern for the public
safety and welfare, in addition to the fact that his release would "tend to deprecate the seriousness of
the instant offense and undem,ine respect for the law.'

third appearance took place before Commissioners Coppola and Cruse, 16 months
later on August 17, 2017. He was again denied because of concern for the public safety and welfare,
because his release would ' tend to deprecate the seriousness of the instant offense and undennine
respect for the law'', because the seriousness of his offense and the escalation it represents were more
compelling than his equities, because of his "callous disregard for human life which remains a
concern" and because his "prior contact with the law and leniency by the courts for prior crimina~
acts" failed to deter him from future crimes.
fourth appearance took place before Commissioners Coppola. Smith I and
Demosthenes, two years later on August 14, 2019. The following materials were submitted to the Board
in support ofrelease:

1 Over the course of~
ve appearances, including the one relevant here, he has appeared before
Commissioner Coppola three times - in 2013, 2017, and 2019. Commissioner Coppola has a reputation
for routinely denying arole to individuals with exceptional records of rehabilitation because of the nature
of their crimes. Given
s tremendous record ofremorse, rehabilitation, sobriety, and community
and family support, and given
four denials lhat turned almost exclusively upon hls pre-prison
conduct, it is clear that Mr.
will never be released should he continue to appear before
Commissioners Coppola.
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A submission by King's County Di strict Attorney Eric Gonzalez, affirmatively supporting.
release given the purposelessness of future incarceration in light of record of rehabilitation
s statement of remorse
letter to the family of the deceased
Dozens of commendable behavior reports and inmate progress reports
release plan, whereby he would live with his stepbrother in New York City,
register with the Fortune Sociecy , work for Chef David Coleman at a restaurant seek training
in the culinary arts, and maintain his sobriety ·
A formal job offer from
Letters of support from

• 1111111111
•
•

Relevant portions of the hearing before and decision by Commissioners Coppola Smith and
Demosthenes are excerpted below.2 Commissioner Demosthenes dissented from the decision to deny
release though without written opinion.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Board violated the Ex:ecutive Law when it departed from
low
COMPAS scores, reaching the irrational, improper, and contradictory conclusion
that his release ·was incompatible with the public safety and welfare and would
undermine respect for the Jaw, without the requisite individualized reasons.

a. The Board departed from
COMPAS scores indicating that he
presents the lowest possible risk of violence or recidivism.

1111111111 COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment ("the Assessment") prepared on August 2,
2019, indicates ''Low" or 'Unlikely" scores for I 1 of the 12 COMPAS categories:

Risk of Felony Violence - 1 - Low
Arrest Risk - 1 - Low
Abscond Risk - l - Low
Criminal Involvement - 6 - Medium

History of Violence - 3 - Low
Prison Misconduct - 5 - Low
ReEntry Substance Abuse - 2 - Unlikely
Negative Social Cognitions - 1 - Unlikely
Low Self-Efficacy/Optimism - 1 - Unlikely
Low Family Support - 1 - Unlikely

ReEntry Financial - 1 - Unlikely
ReEntry Employment Expectations - 1 - Unlikely
Ultjmately, as both to risks - of violence arrest, and abscond.i ng - and their sources - financia"J
scarcity, lack of family support and employment, substance abuse and destructive self-image - the
Assessment assigned the lowest possible scores to-

2

1111111111

All references to -

hearing transcript will be cit.ed as "HT" followed by the page number.
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The Board' s decision that "release to supervision is incompatible with the public safety and
welfare", HT at 18, and that "to grant[] release at this time would so depreca1c the seriousness of [the]
offense as to undermine respect for the law", Id. at 19, th us constituted serious departures from the
Assessment. However, instead of offering individualized reasons for these departures, as is required
by Jaw, the Board improperly, irrationally and arbitrarily fixated upon three immutable aspects of Mr.
past.
Indeed, the Board, in thei.r decision, placed "significant weight'' o~ r ecord ofunlawful
conduct, specifically the "instant offenses where [he] committed a gunpoint planned robbery and shot
and killed a cab driver", Id. The Board stated: "you failed to be deterred from committing those
offenses despite prior sanctions to local jail. Your inability or unwillingness to full y comply with the
law is an aggravating factor against your release". To be clear, the Board did not cite any lack of
re'.11~rse o~ acceptance. of responsibili~ upon
p~ for e-ither ~h: ins~ant offense. or his
cnmmal history, nor d1d the Board denve from - history of criminal involvement some
future risk posed by him; instead, their decision turned merely upon the interlocking fact of Mr.
instant offense having been committed after being convicted of six prior misdemeanors.

1111111111

The Board also specificatly noted
' marginal behavior'' as "troubling", characterized
his failure to accrue a ticket since April 2014 as only " improvement'', highlighted his "agitation" when
confronted with tickets he incurred prior to doing intervention work with at-risk youth, and concluded
with a prescription that he-"use this time to maintain clean disciplinary record to better demonstrate
[his] ability to live crime free." HT at 18-19.
Ultimately, however, none of the Board's three 'reasons' for departing from
COMPAS scores pass muster; they are not 'reasons· that explain the findings that
release
would present some risk to others or the rule of law, but instead, empty conclusions drawn from
immutable facts.

b. The Board may not depart from an individual's COMPAS scores without
identifying the particular scale from which they are departing and offering an
individualized r.eason for such a departure.
The Regulations governing the Board of Parole were revised in 2017 to require "individualized
reasons" for departing from an individual ' s COMPAS scores:

(a) Risk and Needs Principles: In making a release determination, the Board shall be
guided by risk and needs principles, including the inmate's risk and needs scores as
generated by a periodically-validated risk assessment instrument, if prepared by the
D epartment of Corrections and Community Supervision (collectively, ' 'Department
Risk and Needs Assessment"). If a Board determination, denying release, departs
from the Department Risk and Needs Assessment's scores, the Board .shall specify
any scale within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from which it

departed and provide an individualized reason for such departure.
fN.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8002.2 (emphasis added)]
Failure to do so will constitute error warranting reversal and a de novo hearing. in Robinson v. Stanford,
No. 2392-2018 at *2 (Sup. Ct Dutchess Cty. Mar. 13, 2019), Supreme Court ordered a de novo
interview for man with two murder convictions and low COMPAS scores because "the Parole Board's

4
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finding that discretionary release would not be compatible with the welfare of society directly
contradicts these scores in his COMPAS assessment." The court in Robinson continued,
[a]s the Board's determination denying release departed from these risks and needs
assessment scores, pursuant to 9 NY. C.R.R. § 8002.2 it was required to articulate
with specificity the particultir scale in any needs .a nd assessment from which. .it was
departing and provide an individualized reason for such departure. The Board's

conclusory statement that it considered statutory factors, including petitioner's risk to
the community, rehabilitation efforts and need for succe.ssful community re-entry in
finding that discretionary release would not be compatible with the welfare of society
fails to meet this standard. As such, its determination denying parole release was
effected by an error of law."
[Id at *2 (emphasis added).]

See also, Comfort v. Stanford, 2018/1445 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty., 2018) (finding the Board did not
comply with 8002.2(a) by failing to explain its departure from the lowest possible COMPAS risk score
of felony violence, arrest and absconding yet concluding that where was a reasonable probability the
petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law); Fricdgood v. New York State
Bd. ofParole, 22 A.D.3d 950, 951 (3d. Dep' t 2005) (absence of record support for its conclusion that
petitioner is likely to reoffend cumulatively render the Board's decision "so irrational under the
circumstances as to border on impropriety").
Here, the Board departed dramatically from •
COMPAS scores, without the
requisite individua.lized reasons and based upon an irrational disregard for tbe District Attorney's
recommendation and an improper understanding of the sentencing court's statements. The Board's
decision must be reversed, and a de novo hearing held.

c. The facts of the instant offense do not constitute an "individualized reason"
justifying the Board's departure from
COMPAS scores.

At hearing, Commissioner Smith asked to summarize the circumstances
surrounding the instant offense. described hiding a gun across the street before
unsuccessfully attempting to rob someone at a gas station, going to get the gun ("the worst deci.sion of
my life"), thinking that all he was going to do was brandish the gun and ending up pulling the trigger
nnd killing the deceased. HT at 13-14. • urther described running away from the scene and
lying to a police officer who stopped him. Id. 14. He repeatedly expressed awareness that if he had
not made the decision to bring the gun, the deceased would still be alive. Id.

I

Commissioner Coppola then inquired of "Did you ever give any thought to when you
weren't successfuljustto give up, don't go get the gun?" Id. at 14. Mr.answered in the negative,
reiterating that he had hoped to only brandish it. Id at 15. Commissioner Coppola then continued: "It's
unfortunate for everybody that you did not just do what a lot of people do when their robbery attempt
is foiled. They just take off and that's it. You actually went back. Unfortunately, this guy was just
fighting for his property, money he earned to support his family.'' Id. at 15.
. ~ id :not disagree w~th an~hing Commissioner ~oppola was s_a~i~g, instea~ emphasizing
his wntten statement of remorse m w.hich he agreed and admitted respons1b1hty for takmg money he
did not earn. Id. When given an opportunity at the conclusion of the hearing to add anything, Mr.
5
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made, as he has at every prior hearing, a hcartfe.lt extended, statement of remorse, comparing
the loss of his parents, grandmother, sister, and nephew during his incarceration to the Joss be c~used
to the deceased's family; expressing awareness that his rehabilitation does not detract from the hann
he has caused; describing the efforts he has put into formulating a release plan with enough built-in
community support to help him cope with the struggles of readjusting to life after prison. HT at 16.

Fundamentally, at hearing. there was no aspect of the instant offense for which he did
not take responsibility or express deep and heartfelt remorse. He did not deny, as the Board reiterates
over and over again at his hearing, and again in their decision that he "committed a gunpoint planned
robbery and shot and killed a cab driver." HT at 19. He expressed tremendous insight into why and
how he committed the crime, evincing a commitment to avoiding re-creating those circumstances so
that he may never harm another individual. Failure to accept responsibility for, or express remorse for,
or demonstrate insight into the instant offense would, of course provide legitimate individualized
reasons for departing from otherwise positive COMPAS scores. But here, there was no such evidence,
of any kind. The Board' s reliance upon the instant offense in light of Mr. COMPAS scores,
3
was, thus, error requiring reversal and a de no-i:o hearing.

d.

criminal history does not constitute an "individ ualizcd reason"
justifying the Board's departure f r o m - COMPAS scores.

The Board's decision also highlighted "record of unlawful conduct" finding that be
"failed to be deterred from committing [the instant offense] despite prior sanctions to local jail. ' HT at
18. They continued that "[his] inabi lity or unwillingness to fully comply with the law is an aggravating
fac1or~ ] release:' HT at 16. But these too fail to constitute individualized reasons to depart
from
COMP AS scores that categorically deemed him the lowest possible risk of future
violence, arrest, and absconding.

Jt .is true that despite' being previously convicted of six petty misdemeanors, and being s e n ~
in some of those occasions, to jail, that Mr. still commit1ed the instant offense . • himself attributes his lack of specific deterrence in 1990 to his cocaine addiction, and his wrongheaded
decision to both purchase and carry a gun. But fundamentally, where Mr. COMPAS assigns,
in the present time, the lowest possible scores to his risk of future arrest, absconding, or violence, as
well as the lowest possible scores to the kinds of instabilities or vulnerabilities that make one predisposed to crime - self-image. family and financial support, substance abuse, etc. - after 29 years
Importantly, the First, Second, and Fourth Departments have held that the Board must consider all
statutory requirements and cannot base the decision to deny solely on the nature of the crime. See King v.
New York State Div. ·of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423,433 (1st Dep't 1993), aff'd 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)(" ... the
legislature has detennined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude parole, there must be a
showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself.); Rossakis
v. New York Stace Bd. OfParole 146 A.D. 3d 22, 27 (1st Dep't 2016) (Holding the Board acted irrationality
in focusing exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner's conviction and the decedent's family victim
im pact statements ... without giving genuine consideration to petitioner's remorse, institutional
achievements, release plan, and her lack of any prior criminal history.); V. Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole,
2018-I 00865 (Sup. Ct., NY Cty., 2019) (finding Board ,relied almost exclusively on the seriousness of the
crime and statements petitioner made at time of sentence); Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945 (2d Dep't
2011) ("Where the Parole Board denies release to parole solely on the basis ofthe seriousness of the offense,
in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, it acts irrationally."); Johnson v. New York State Div. of
Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dep't 2009)
3
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of incarceration,
record prior to the instant offense is not a reason to depart from the
Assessment. The Board's inference that Mi:. would not be deterred from committing future
crimes or that release would undermine the law after 29 years of incarceration, sobriety, and thoughtful
rehabilitation is utterly belied by the record; it does not justify the Board's departure, it mei:ely
contradicts •
IIIIIIIIIIIAssessment.

COMPAS itself indicates why an individual's criminal history does not provide helpful guidance
as to future risk. A look-back at . . . .trajectory ofCOMPAS scores in the history ofvioJence
and criminal involvement categories indicate that once an i.ndividual arrives in prison w i t ~
criminal histo:ry and having committed the instant offen.se their scores wilf never change. history of violence scores is as follows:
5/14/2013 - 3 ('Low ')
5/22/2015 - 3 (''Low")
3/3 0/2016- 3 ("Low';)
7/25/2017 - 3 ("Low' )
8/2/2019-3 ("Low 1 )

And his COlvf.PAS traje.ctory as.to criminal involvement is as follows:
5/14/2013 - 5 (..Low')
5/22/2015 - 6 ("Medium")
3/30/2016 - 6 ("Medium")
7/25/2017- 6 ('"Medium")
8/2/2019 - 6 (' Medium')
Both indicate a fixedness that follows from the unchanging and unchangeable nature of one's criminal
record - o~
aving committed six petty misdemeanors and the instant offense.4·
Ultimately can do nothing to lower these numbers. He cannot go back in time and alter
his pre-prison history of addiction and petty crime nor can he change the fundamental truth of his
having committed the instant offense. He himself remorsefully admits this, at every single Board
appearance; his COMPAS scores for criminal involvement and history of violence reflect this. And it
is precisely because of the unchanging, unchangeable nature o~
s criminal history that it is
not an "individualized reason' for departing from COMPAS scores that offer direct guidance as to Mr.
present-day fitness for release, all of which weigh in favor of his freedom.
e. Mr. -

history of prison misconduct docs not constitute an "individualized

reason" justifying the Board's departure from Mr. -

COMPAS scores.

2019 COWAS scores included a score of 5, deemed "low" for prison misconduct.
For the Board to emphasize repeatedly his "marginal conduct" and prescribe that he "maintain a clean
record'' prior to his next Board appearance thus represented a departure from 'low" 2019
COMPAS prison misconduct score, and one that they cannot adequately justify.

Mr.-

The argument that his history ofviofence score is predicated in part, upon
history of prison
misconduct (and that prison misconduct is within his control) is una,•ailable; while his prison misconduct
score has fluctuated as he has received various tickets, discussed supra, his history of violence score has
remained unchanged in more than six years, reflecting its exclusive relationship to the instant offense.

4
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First and foremost, COMPAS score for prison misconduct was deemed "low", taking
into account his historic pattern of Tier JI and Tier III tickets. The Board thus appears, in discussions
during the hearing, to have conducted their own qualitative analysis o - h i s t o r y of prison
misconduct in lieu of COMPAS' quantitative analysis. At the hearing, the Board first fixated upon Mr.
April 2014 Tier III ticket - .the ticket specifically cited in their decision, and his last infraction
prior to ~ 2 0 1 9 hearing. Commissioner Smith asked Mr. about the underlying facts,
to which responded: "That was totally my fault, I got involved in a debate that turned into
an argument and next thing you know I was fighting. ' HT :at 8.
A copy of the relevant ticket is included here., and indicates that the incident was a simple fistfight
involvin_g no we:pons, and one that .
j ceased to participate in the moment he was instructed
to stop. Exbi it.,) ("I gave him a direct order to break, and .he compfied without further incident.").

I

Commissioner Smith then askec a l l l l about three Tier lH violations dated August 2007 {12
years prior to the h e a r i n ~ l (28 years prior to the hearing). and October l 990 (29 years prior
to the hearing). HT at 9.proceeded to explain his history of prison misconduct as follows:
The weapons and the fighting, that was earlier in my incarceration: And yes, I believe
at that time I was angry and lashing out at anything that confronted me. So I would
have to agree with you: yes, at that time I was angry.

[HT at 9.)
Mr. did not deny responsibility for his past; instead, he agreed with Commissioner Smith that
he has historically struggled with managing his temper, particularly when he was first received into
DOCCS custody in 1990. He continued to explain his efforts to address his underlying substance abuse
problems and his need for rehabilitation, specifically around the acceptance of responsibility for the
instant offense. Id. at 10. In this vein, highlighted the Alternative· Value program, where he
was able to meet with other people who committed violent crimes but were able to turn their lives
around, and the Delinquents Intervention Program, where he was able to attempt to intervene in the
lives of at-risk young people. Id. at 11. That Mr. had participated in the latter program in 2004,
2005, and 2006, then became the subject of a detailed discussion. Commissioner Smith stated:
The difficulty is if I look at those years, after that you assaulted staff and had urinalysis 5
Tier IIJ' s, violent conduct, so I mean you might be a great presenter but you didn t get
a chance to tell the students about what you were gonna do in the future, which was
negative, right?
[HT at 11.]
Commissioner Smith appeared to be insinuating that
part1c1pation in the youth
intervention program - a program from which he had derived tremendous meaning - was
explained this June 2013 Tier Ill ticket at his first appearance - the ticket arose from Mr.
shy bladder; his inability to provide a urine sample whife supervised. Setting aside the fact that
t 1s tic et was more than six years old when it was dredged up by Commissioner Smith, the underlying
facts demonstrate no intransigence violence, or impulse ~ ! e m s on part, and should
never have been made the basis of any prejudice against . . . .
8
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disingenuous given his subsequent prison misconduct. ~
esponded with a clear and calm
a.rticulation regarding a fact of aU recovery - the inevitability of setbacks. Id. ("I mean, I definitely
talk about the negative stuff, I was able to talk about the setbacks." ( emphasis added), He did not reject
the Commissioners assertions, instead incorporating them into a larger (and more realistic) narrative
of his rehabilitation over time.
Accordingly·then explained that at every program in which he has participated he tries
to discuss his setbacks and his failings, admitting that he had not been perfect since his early 2000' s
participation with young people. Without responding directly, Commissioner Smith continued to
emphasize the facto~
having committed infractions after engaging in a youth intervention
program. Id. at 12. This discussion would provide the basis for the Board' s determination in their
decision that demonstrated "agitation" when confronted with his record of prison
misconduct; no agitation, however, is apparent on the face of the record. All that is clear is that Mr.
was attempting to respond to an inference Commissioner Smith was drawing from his timeline
of programming and prison misconduct, with a reatistjc confession as to his susceptibi lity to stumble.
HT at 18-19.
It is undeniable that over the course ofincarceration, he has incurred numerous Tier
II and Tier III tickets,1111111111 Prison Misconduct COMPAS score has fluctuated accordingly:
5/14/2013 - 5 ("Low")
5/22/2015 - IO ("High")
3/30/2016 - 10 ("High")
7/25/2017 -8 ("High")
8/2/201 9 - 5 (" Low")
To identify tickets cl.ose in time to Board hearings is, accordingly, appropriate. Indeed, at
first appearance subsequent to his April 5,.2014 Tier 11£ ticket (when his COMP AS score jumped from
5 to 10), the Board made note of it both during the hearing and in their decision. But the Board, at the
subsequent April 26, .20I 6 de nova hearing and August 17, 2017 reappearance, made no note of Mr.
2014 Tier III, recognizing t h a - had had no disciplinary infractions since his last
appearance.

But when -

has gone five years without incurring a single infraction, restoring his
COMPAS prison misconduct score to 5 ("Low"), the Board's renewed focus on Mr. fiveyear~old Tier ll1 infraction at his August 14, 2019 re-appearance is fundamentally without basis and
represents an unexplained and unexplainable departure fromllllllllll Risk Assessment. See Rivera
v. Stanford, 172 A.D.3d 872, 874 (2d. Dep't 2019) (internal citations omitted) (finding that the Parole
Board's det.ennination that petitioner's release was not compatible with the welfare of society based
upon his disciplinary record while imprisoned is without support in the record ... The Parole Board
determination stated that "[oJf significant concern is [the petitioner's] poor behavior during this term."
Yet, from the time of the petitioner's 20.14 appearance befor-e the Parole Board until the time of.his
2016 appearance before the Parole Board, the petitioner had no disciplinary infractions. Moreover, the
petitioner's only disciplinary infractions since 20 11 related to failing to report an assault upon him;
having excess stamps, cigarettes, and prescribed medication in his cell; and possessing contact
infonnation of a prison employee, who was his fiance at the time of his 2016 application.). Here, more
significantly than Rivera, last disciplinary infraction was three Parole Board appearances,
or five years, prior, to his hearing.

9
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Ultimately, the Board's decision evinces irrationality bordering on impropriety, in light of Mr.
universally low COMPAS scores regarding everything that is within his power to change,
and everything that indicates his future risk to others: his risk of felony violence, re-arrest,
abscortding and p:rison misconduct, his relationships, personality, family. self-image, and future
employment and financial prospects. See, e.g. Mauer of Coleman v. New York State Dep 't ofCorr. &
Cmty. Supervision, 157 A.D.3d 672, 673 (2d. Dep' t 2018) (reversing denial of Art. 78 petition because
the " petitioner .. .was assessed " low" for all risk factors on his COMPAS risk assessment. Thus, a
review of the record demonstrates that in light of all the factors, not\vithstanding the seriousness ofthe
underlying offense, the Parole Board's ' detennination to deny the petitioner release on parole evinced
irrationality bordering on impropriety."') (emphasis added). Nothing they cited as arguable bases for
these departures actually constitute individualized reasons, and as such, each and every departure
constituted arbitrary and capricious error warning reversal and a new hearing. That the Board also
disre-garded the D istrict Attorney's recommendation and misunderStood the sentencing court's
statements further underscores the need for a de novo hearing.

-

Il.

1111111111

The Board evinced .a ,profound misunderstanding of the statements of the.sentencing
court and a total disregard for the recommendation of the District Attorney in
violation of the Executive Law.

N.Y. Exec. Law§ 259-i (McKinney) states, in relevant part,
In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted pursuant to subdivision
four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following
be considered ...

(vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence.
length of sentence and recommendations ofthe sentencing court, the district attorney,
the attomey for the inmate, the pre-sentence probation report as well as consideration
of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to
confinement

[(emphases added).]
In this vein, Kings County District Attorney Eric Gonzalez wrote a Jetter forlllllllllll,arole packet
explicitly supporting his release to parole supervision. jt ~. DA Gonz~cause of Mr.
CO:MPAS score, his "honest and forthcoming" demeanor during a meeting with a
representative ADA, and his " complete and credible n arrative of his journey from a hopeless young
inmate full of denial and self-loathing into a changed, compassionate man committed to positive
thinking and acts of service." Id. The Board was required to cons~xtraordinary
recommendation - instead, however, they failed to mention the letter during hearing and
merely noted the existence of these "comments'' in their decis.ion. HT at 18 ("\Ve also note comments
from the Ki11gs County District Attorney ....").
Failure to give more than lip service to the DA' s submission, in and of itself, constituted error.
Ef ecting to consider, instead, al great length, the imposition by the sentencing court of a 25 to Life
sentence, was further error. The relevant exchange is excerpted in full here.
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Q: Your areas where the scores rise some include history of violence, which makes
sense ifwe review your criminal history. Your criminal involvement is a medium, even
higher, where it's starting to give the volume itself, as well as prison misconduct which
for you is a score of five, basically right in the middle of the one to 10. The reality is
we look at the facts and I think there were like approximately eight Tier Ill's, nine Tier
II's, the most recently Tier III was in 2014 so a little bit more than five years ago. Whm
you have a 25 to life sentence tltere,s some co11ceptyou ought to have 25 good years
and then you get to leave because that's the minim.11m, right?
A: Yeah.

Q: That's wltat tltey call it, tlie minimum. The maximum is life, so if you're
misbehaving a11d breaking rules and 1tol programming, doing whatever flegative,
tlten you work towards life. So why ltave 15 plus violations, which ltalf oftltose are
serious Tier Ill's, why the struggles?
A: A lot of the struggles came were in the beginning of my incarceration when I was .
still not following rules or regulations, J dido't care, didn't think Twould be able to
make it towards th.is 25 years, so that was the reason why I was lashing out and I still
didn't come to grips with what I had done where I was able to start rehabilitating. That
was one of the reasons I was catching these misbehavior reports early on in my
incarceration.
Q: Again, that's why we ltave tlte minimum and the maximum. We want you to come
in anti be - tltere's 11otltiflg that Commissioner Smitit or Coppola or Demostlte11es
ca11 say that's got more power than wizen the judge imposed a life sentence. Judge
S'tarky doing that; that's more profollnd tlia11 anything we can say. You did have a
violent co11duct back in 2014, that's your most recent Tier III violation, flgliting,
creating a disturbance and violent conduct, what happened i11 tliat matter?

[HT at 7-8 (emphasis addea).]
Commissioner Smith thus intertwined at e
one "work[s] towards life" from a minimum of
25 years with a quantitative analysis of
history of Tier II and Tier III tickets specifically
because ofthe senrencingjudge 's decision to impose a sentence of25 to Life. HT at 15 ("there's nothing
that Commissioner Smith or Coppola or Demosthenes can say that's got more power than when the
judge imposed a life sentence. Judge Starky doing that., that' s more profound than anything we can
say.>t). Ultimately, Commissioner Smith appears to have engaged in an analysis whereby Mr.tickets added some - albeit unknown-period oftime to his minimum of 25 years. at some unknown
time, after some unknown aggregate oftickets (and perhaps other failings), arriving at a Life sentence
- a consequence specifically contemplated by the sentencing judge, according to Commissioner
Smith,
Commissioner Smith appears not to know that for second degree murder in the state of New
York, the only authorized sentence end in the words "to Life." Penal Law § 70.00(3)(a)(i)( l).
Undisputedly, Judge Starkey had. no option but to impose a sentence that contemplates the possibility
of Jjfe imprisonment. And as such, the sentence did not have specific significance in the case of Mr.
Of course, the decision by Judge Starkey to impose a fufl 25 year minimum (when anything
from 15 to 25 was statutorily authorized) was a recommendation for the Board to consider. Similarly,
11
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Judge Starkey could have made a recommendation at sentencing or before the Parole Board, as to Mr.
fitness or lack thereof for parole supervision. The words "to Life", however, were
categorically not a' recommendation" warranting the Board ' s consideration.6
The implications of Commissioner Smith's understanding of the sentencing court' s
recommendations are devastating, and draconian: they invite a world whereby an infraction adds time
to an individual's sentence, but without any competing consideration; without any recognition, that.
commensurately, rehabilitation, remorse, and release planning detract from a sentence. DA Gonzalez
specifically wrote his letter to avoid this outcome - this perversion of the parole system:

My position is that justice includes mercy and the possibility ofredemption, and that
our parole sysrem should be a meaningful one that focuses not only on the
circumstances of the c1·ime itself, fore1,·e r unchangeable, buJ on the individual seeking
parole today and the efforts he or she has undertaken since the crime lo reflect, gmw,
contribute, and atone.
And yet, the Board elected to ignore his specific guidance - a guidance specifically.contemplated by
statute - and hit with another 18 months based upon an erroneous understanding of the
sentencing court.

CONCLUSION
31 years ago,
attempted to rob a taxi driver at a gas station and when he failed ,
killed that very taxi driver and fled the scene. Not a day goes by where Kenneth does not feel remorse
for the life he ·.:;al\ously and pointlessly t ook; not a day goes by where he does not try to be a better
man. To continue to deny his freedom is to render meaningle s recent changes to parole in
New York State - to disregard new regulations that require the Board to judge an inmate less by the
crime they committed and more by the person they have become since. In the District Attorney's own
words, "justice is not served ' by keeping in prison a person like ; ~ r i o d of
incarceration .. .wouJd be excessive.'' The Board of Parole' s most recent deniaJ of- -relcase
must be reversed, and a de nova hearing held.

Respect~
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RONALD !,A(UBY
Law Office of Ronald. L Kuby
119 West 23rd Street, Suite 900
New York, NY 10011
212-529-0223
rhivatrivedi @gmail.com

Fundamentally, lhe presence of the words "'to Life" are irrelevant to the Parole Board's duties and
obligations. The Parole Board has a duty to conduct meaningful review as to whether a particular individual
is tit for release, and if not, to revisit that question within two years. Put another way, the Board only has
the authority to add another two years to an individual's period of incarceration. They do not and cannot
ele<:t, at any time, to impose or not impose a "life sentence."
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